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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960

CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
Motor Vehicle Chattel Mortgages-Dual Aspects of Notice by
Registration and Filing. In Olympia State Bank & Trust Co. v. Craft1
the Washington court answered for the first time the question whether
compliance with registration under the Washington Highway License
Act2 supersedes the chattel mortgage act3 in establishing lien priorities
of chattel mortgagees on motor vehicles. The court held that a chattel
mortgagee of a motor vehicle must comply with both the registration
provisions of the motor vehicle registration acte and the filing provisions of the chattel mortgage act5 in order to establish a lien priority
over creditors, subsequent purchasers, and encumbrancers of the motor
vehicle.
The court was presented with the following fact pattern. Craft executed to the bank a chattel mortgage on two automobiles in May,
1955, to secure a note in the sum of $2,309. The certificates of ownership to the two automobiles were indorsed to show the bank as the legal
owner, in compliance with the motor vehicle registration act.' The
Department of Licenses and the parties made the appropriate changes
on the registration certificate. The bank, however, failed to file the
chattel mortgage in the office of the county auditor as required by the
7
chattel mortgage act.
On February 14, 1958, the bank commenced this action to foreclose
the chattel mortgage alleging that Craft had defaulted in the payments
on the note. On March 5, 1958, Craft was adjudged a bankrupt and a
trustee was appointed and qualified. The trustee, representing the
general creditors of the bankrupt, was granted leave to intervene in
the foreclosure proceedings. The trustee's complaint in intervention
1 156 Wash. Dec. 481, 354 P2d 386 (1960).
2 RCW 46.

3 RCW 61.04.
46.12.170: "If, after a certificate of ownership is issued, a mortgage is
placed on the vehicle described therein, the registered owner shall, within ten days
thereafter, present his application to the director, signed by the mortgagee, to which
shall be attached the certificate of license registration and the certificate of ownership
last issued covering the vehicle.... The director, if he is satisfied that there should
be a reissue of the certificates, shall note such change upon his records and issue to the
registered owner a new certificate of license registration and to the mortgagee a new
certificate of ownership."
5 RCW 61.04.020: "(1) A mortgage of personal property is void as against all
-creditors of the mortgagor, both existing and subsequent, whether or not they have or
claim a lien upon such property, and against all subsequent purchasers, pledgees, and
mortgagees and encumbrancers for value and in good faith . . . and unless it is acknowledged and filed within ten days from the time of the execution thereof in the
-office of the county auditor of the county in which the mortgaged property is situated
as provided by law."
6 Supra note 4.
7 Supra note 5.
4 RCW
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alleged that the bank had failed to file its chattel mortgage with the
county auditor and that the chattel mortgage was therefore void as
against the claims of the general creditors of the bankrupt. As summarized by the court, "the trial court held the motor vehicle registration act superseded the filing act, and 'that it has become no longer
necessary for a chattel mortgagee of any motor vehicle to comply with
...RCW 61.04.020 [the filing act].' "'
The Washington court reversed the trial court's decision and answered the question which had been raised in Merchants Rating &
Adjusting Co. v. Skaug' In Merchants Rating the court held that noncompliance with the motor vehicle registration act and compliance with
the chattel mortgage filing provisions did not preserve the priority of
the lien of the mortgagee as to creditors. In Merchants Rating the
court avoided answering the question whether the title registration act
was enacted to establish a title system similar to the Torrens system"
of land title registration or merely an enactment to aid state officers in
eniorcing police regulations as to such vehicles. 1 The court chose to
decide against the mortgagee on the equitable principle that "of two
persons injured by the wrongful act of a third, he who makes the loss
possible must suffer."' 2
In the instant case, the court reasoned that the legislature did not
intend the registration act to be a filing act. The court's reasons were
that the registration act made no provision for establishing constructive notice of the lien; contained no provision for lien priorities or
which class of creditors might be protected by compliance with the
act; lacked a requirement that the original instruments be filed for
public inspection; and was devoid of a provision for enforcement of a
lien claim or for fixing venue." These same four reasons were put
forth by the court for concluding that the registration act lacked the
essential requirements of a conclusive motor vehicle title act.'
Thus the court was able to conclude that the registration act and the
8 156 Wash. Dec. 481, 483, 354 P.2d 386, 387 (1960).

9 4 Wn.2d 46, 102 P.2d 227 (1940), discussed in Comment, 15 WASH. L. REwv. 182
(1940).
10 The purpose of the registration of title is to make title ascertainable by reference
to a certificate issued by a government official. This certificate is issued after a judicial proceeding in the nature of a suit to quiet title, and all subsequent transfers or
transactions, affecting the title are either noted on the certificate, or on a new certificate substituted for it.
11 Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wn.2d 46, 51, 102 P.2d 227, 229
(1940).
1Id. at 52, 102 P.2d at 230, citing Von Normann v. Woodson, 182 Wash. 271, 46
P.2d 1050 (1935).
'3 156 Wash. Dec. 481, 484, 354 P.2d 386, 388 (1960).

14 Ibid.
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filing act were not inconsistent, and that they could be read together,
with meaning, force and validity given to each." The court took notice
that "motor vehicles are so mobile and transient in nature that one
obvious reason for the enactment of the registration act could have
been to deter the sales or illegal transfer of stolen vehicles and to aid
in their detection.' 8
The Washington court has aligned itself with those courts which interpret motor vehicle registration statutes as an exercise of the police
power which does not supersede existing notice requirements of chattel
mortgage statutes.'7 Some courts reach the opposite result," basing
their decisions on legislative repeal by implication; the obvious superiority of actual notice; and the difficulty of searching the files of the
various counties. Often, however, those courts are interpreting statutes
with a general "repealer clause,"' 9 which allows a reasonable basis for
them to overcome the presumption that the legislature repeals by express provision only.
Judge Mallery, dissenting alone, maintained that actual notice under
the registration act and constructive notice under the chattel mortgage
act were not concurrently required because of the custom of the legislature to make acts dealing with motor vehicles sui generis. His opinion attacked the onerous nature of the dual requirements with strong
language:
No one has or can point out a single safeguard in the chattel mortgage
act that is not more effectively accomplished by the registration act.
Nor can anyone show anything to be accomplished by complying with
the chattel mortgage act after complying with the title registration act.
...No

legitimate purpose is served by giving notice to strangers who

20
have only a disinterested curiosity.

The respondent's brief urged that the court take judicial notice of
the public acceptance of the motor vehicle registration act as being
conclusive in negating the necessity of the chattel mortgage filing provisions." These arguments as to the lack of utility of a chattel mortgage filing in addition to motor vehicle registration failed to impress
Is See, e.g., Lindsey v. Superior Court, 33 Wn. 2d 94, 204 P.2d 482 (1949).
10156 Wash.
Dec. 481, 485, 354 P.2d 386, 388 (1960).

17 Amick v. Exchange State Bank, 164 Minn. 136, 204 N.W. 639 (1925) ; King-

Godfrey,
Inc. v. Rogers, 157 Okla. 216, 11 P.2d 935 (1932).
18
E.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. American Mfg. Co., 155 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944).
11 E.g., "All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are
hereby repealed!'
20 156 Wash. Dec. 481, 486-87, 354 P2d 386, 388 (1960).
21
Brief for Respondent, pp. 7-9, Olympia State Bank & Trust Co. v. Craft, 156
Wash. Dec. 481, 354 P2d 386 (1960).
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the majority of the court. While certainly it is difficult for one to see
any worthwhile purpose to be served by the dual requirements of registration and filing, the court chose to base its decision on the fact that
the legislature had failed to define its intention in the two enactments.
Therefore, the resolution of the problem of the needless dual requirements for maintaining the lien priority of a chattel mortgagee on a
motor vehicle has been placed squarely upon the legislature.
Several courses of action are open to the legislature in resolving this
problem. The chattel mortgage statute2 2 could be amended to exclude
motor vehicles from the filing provisions. The motor vehicle registration statute23 could be amended to establish it as the exclusive means
of registration and notification as to chattel mortgages. The Washington court in Olympia State Bank has specifically directed to the legislature's attention four shortcomings in the motor vehicle statute which
prevent it from being a filing act or a conclusive motor vehicle title act.'
The legislature may well look to the enactments of sister states in
this matter. The California Vehicle Code25 is especially clear in dealing with these areas noted by the court and some others, such as a
longer filing period and liens for services and materials. The legislature
probably would examine the provisions of the conditional sale contract
statute 26 at the same time it considers a treatment of this problem regarding chattel mortgages.2"
22

RCW 61.04.

23 RCW 46.12.
24 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
25 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 6300: "(a) No chattel mortgage on any vehicle registered
under this code . . . is valid against creditors or subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers until the mortgagee or his successor or assignee has deposited with the
department, at its office in Sacramento ... a properly endorsed certificate of ownership to the vehicle subject to the mortgage showing the chattel mortgagee as legal
owner if the vehicle is then registered under this code, or if the vehicle is not so
registered an application in usual form for an original registration, together with an
application for registration of the chattel mortgagee as the legal owner, and upon payment of the fees as provided in this code.
(b) Deposit of a certificate within 30 days after the date of a mortgage shall be
deemed a deposit within reasonable time."
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 6301: "When the chattel mortgagee, his successor or assignee,
has deposited with the department a properly endorsed certificate of ownership showing the mortgagee as the legal owner or an application in the usual form for an original
registration, together with an application for registration of the chattel mortgagee as
legal owner, the deposit constitutes constructive notice of the mortgage to creditors
and subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, but the mortgaged vehicle shall be subject to a lien for services and materials .... "
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 6303: "The method provided in this part for giving constructive notice of a chattel mortgage on a vehicle registered under this code is exclusive,
the execution of the chattel mortgage need not be acknowledged or proved and certified, and any such chattel mortgage is excepted from the provisions of [sections relating to recording of mortgages on personal property]."
26

RCW 63.12.

27 RCW 63.12.010 provides that all conditional sales contracts shall be absolute as
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Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code by the legislature
would relieve the need for piecemeal action in this matter. Section
9-30228 of the Code specifically exempts from the filing provisions of
the Code motor vehicles subject to a central filing statute.
Until legislative action is taken to remove the dual requirement of
compliance with the chattel mortgage filing and the motor vehicle registration provisions, the prudent Washington mortgagee will have to
comply with both in order to maintain a lien priority on a motor
vehicle.
ROBERT DEBRuYN
Litigation of a Tort Claim in a Garnishment Proceeding-Levy
of Execution Upon a Tort Claim. In the recent case of Murray v.
Mossrnan1 the Washington court held that a judgment creditor, in a
garnishment proceeding, cannot litigate the issue of whether the judgment debtor's insurance company acted negligently or in bad faith as
to its insured, by failing to accept a settlement offer made by the
creditor.
The case arose as a result of the plaintiff's recovery of a judgment
against the defendant in a claim arising out of an automobile collision.
Prior to the entry of the judgment, the plaintiff offered to settle with
the defendant's insurance company within the defendant's policy limits.
This offer was refused. Thereafter, a judgment was entered against
the defendant in excess of the policy limits. The plaintiff, claiming
that the defendant's insurance company had demonstrated negligence
or bad faith toward its insured by not accepting the offer of settlement within the policy limits, caused a writ of garnishment to issue
against the insurance company. The plaintiff intended to litigate the
to all bona fide purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees, encumbrancers and subsequent
creditors unless a signed memorandum of the sale is filed within ten days after the
vendee
takes possession in the auditor's office of the vendee's county of residence.
28
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302: "(3) The filing provisions of this article
do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a statute ... Note: states to
select either Alternative A or Alternative B. Alernative A-(b) of this state which
provides for central filing of, or which requires indication on a certificate of title of,
such security interests in such property. Alternative B-(b) of this state which provides for central filing of security interests in such property, or in a motor vehicle
which is not inventory held for sale for which a certificate of title is required under
the statutes of this state if a notation of such a security interest can be indicated by a
public official on a certificate or duplicate thereof. (4) A security interest in property
covered by a statute described in subsection (3) can be perfected only by registration
or filing under that statute or by indication of the security interest on a certificate of
title or a duplicate thereof by a public official."
29 See, Shattuck, Secured Transactions (Other Than Real Estate Mortgages)-A
Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9,
29 WAsH. L. Rnv. 195, 210 & nn. 91 & 92 (1954).
1156 Wash. Dec. 924, 355 P.2d 985 (1960).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

issue of negligence or bad faith in the garnishment proceedings. The
insurance company, in answer to the writ, conceded that it owed the
plaintiff the amount of the judgment up to the limits of the policy, but
denied holding any funds of the judgment debtor's in excess of the
policy limits. The writ was dismissed. On appeal, the court held that
although the insured would have a claim against the insurance company for negligent or bad faith failure2 to settle within the policy limits
and could recover damages in excess of the policy limits, the judgment
creditors could not complain of such a failure to settle. The judgment
creditor can only recover up to the policy limits in his action against
the debtor's insurance company, unless the debtor's policy provides to
the contrary.'
The court's position on the question of the creditor's rights against
the debtor's insurance company in excess of the policy limits is the
same as that of the commentators' 4 and other jurisdictions which have
considered the problem.5 However, such a position seems open to question, considering the state's garnishment statutes.6 One rationale suggested for the court's position is that the insured's right of recovery
is based upon bad faith or negligence and "sounds in tort."7 In order
for the insurance company to be subject to liability beyond the policy
limits, there must have been a violation of some duty on the part of
the insurance company, which, although existing between the insur2 There is a split of authority regarding the question of whether the insurer must
have been guilty of bad faith or just negligent in its failure to settle in order to give
rise to a claim by the insured. Washington has followed the "bad faith" rule. Evans v.
Continental Cas. Co., 40 Wn.2d 614, 245 P.2d 470 (1952); Burnham v. Commercial
Cas. Ins. Co., 10 Wn.2d 624, 117 P.2d 644 (1941). However, the language in the above
mentioned cases does not seem to foreclose the possibility of allowing the insured to
recover for the insurer's negligent failure to settle. See 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 4713 (1942) for jurisdictions which follow the "negligence" rule.
3 If the judgment debtor's policy provides that "after a writ of execution against the
insured is returned unsatisfied, the creditor may recover against the insurance company
to the same extent that the insured could if he had paid the judgment," or similar
language, the creditor is permitted to recover in excess of the policy limits to the same
extent that the debtor would have been able to recover from the insurer for negligent
or bad faith failure to settle. Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 101 F.2d
987 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Sturgis v. Canal Ins. Co., 122 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1960) ; Auto Mut.
Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938).
48 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 4711 at 74, and § 4713 at 83 (1942) ; Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1175
(1954).
5Chittick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 276 (D. Del. 1958);
Wessing v. American Indem. Co., 127 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Mo. 1955) ; Canal Ins. Co.
v. Sturgis, 114 So. 2d 469 (Dist. Ct. Fla. 1959), aff'd, 122 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1960) ;
Francis v. Newton, 75 Ga. App. 341, 43 S.E.2d 282 (1947) ; Duncan v. Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co., 91 N.H. 349, 23 A.2d 325 (1941) ; Paul v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256,
311 P.2d 376 (1957).
6 It is interesting to note that there was no mention in the Murray case of the Washington garnishment statutes.
7 Murray v. Mossman, 156 Wash. Dec. 924, 927, 355 P.2d 985, 987 (1960).
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ance company and its insured, cannot be extended to the judgment
creditor.
This argument assumes that the judgment creditor takes the position that there was a duty owing toward him. However, this does not
seem to be the case. The judgment creditor claimed that there was a
duty existing as to the insured, and that there was a breach of that
duty, which gave rise to a claim in favor of the insured. The creditor,
then, merely stands in the shoes of his debtor when he asserts this
claim.
There seems to be concern in the Murray case on the part of the
court over the propriety of litigating unliquidated tort claims in a
garnishment proceeding.' The Washington position on this matter is
explicitly dealt with in Bassett v. McCarty.' In the Bassett case, the
plaintiff commenced an action to recover a sum of one thousand dollars from the defendant. Subsequently, he caused a writ of garnishment to issue upon a third party against whom the defendant had
recovered a verdict in a slander action. No judgment had been entered, however. The court, after conceding that the garnishment statutes do not expressly prohibit an unliquidated tort claim from being
the subject of a garnishment proceeding, declared:
To say, however, that unliquidated claims are the subject of garnishment would be, in our opinion, to impose a burdensome and unreasonable duty upon third parties who are in no way concerned with the
outcome of the main action. A garnishee defendant, in such cases,
would be under a duty to evaluate and disclose, under oath, every possible and conceivable claim that the principal defendant might have
against him, no matter how technical or conjectural such claim might
be. To hold that [RCW 7.32.040 and 7.32.100], which require the
garnishee defendant to "answer on oath what, if anything, he is indebted to the [principal] defendant," are broad enough to include unliquidated damages, would be, in our opinion, to stretch the language
of the statute to unreasonable proportions.' 0
But the applicable statutes do not have to be stretched to permit
such an action in this case. RCW 7.32.030 provides:
Before the issuance of the writ of garnishment the plaintiff or someone in his behalf shall make application therefor by affidavit, stating
the facts authorizing the issuance of the writ, and that the plaintiff
8 The same problem was reflected in Paul v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d

376 (1957).
03 Wn.2d 488, 101 P.2d 575 (1940).
This case was not mentioned in the Murray
opinion,
yet it appears to be directly in point.
0
1 Id.at 497, 101 P.2d at 578-79.
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has reason to believe, and does believe, that the garnishee, stating his
name and residence, is indebted to the defendant.... (Emphasis
added.)
Statement of a tort theory, upon which the indebtedness rests, seems
to be consistent with this language. If the garnishee defendant denies
any indebtedness to the defendant, the plaintiff will then have an opportunity to litigate the matter. RCW 7.32.250 provides:
If the plaintiff should not be satisfied with the answer of the garnishee
he may controvert the same by affidavit in writing signed by him,
stating that he has good reason to believe and does believe that the
answer of the garnishee is incorrect, stating in what particulars he
believes the same is incorrect.
Again, this language does not preclude the plaintiff's belief of the garnishee's indebtedness from resting upon tort theory. In any event, the
garnishee defendant will have an opportunity to litigate this matter in
the garnishment proceedings."
The issue to be resolved in the garnishment proceeding appears to
be the existence of the indebtedness, not the basis of the indebtedness.
The basis of the indebtedness is merely the means of determining the
existence of the indebtedness. For example, A recovers a judgment
against B. A learns of a contractual obligation existing between B
and C which has supposedly resulted in C's indebtedness to B for a
sum certain. A causes a writ of garnishment to issue and C answers
claiming that he is not indebted to B. The basis for C's answer is the
fact that he believes that there was fraud in the inducement of the
B-C contract on the part of B. If A controverts C's answer to the
writ, a trial will follow to determine whether or not C is indebted to
B. The basis for the resolution of the issue of indebtedness will be
the determination of the presence or absence of fraud, a tortious act.
Similarly, in the Murray case, the basis for the indebtedness is the
presence or absence of a tortious act. While it is true that, in the
Murray case, the debt was unliquidated in the sense that no judgment
had been entered upon that cause of action (the negligent or bad faith
refusal to settle), the amount of the obligation was not uncertain. The
indebtedness of the insurance company to its insured would equal the
difference between the policy limits and the amount of the judgment.12
Likewise, in the example set forth above, the contractual obligation
would be unliquidated in that the garnishee defendant denies the ob11 RCW 7.32.250.
12

Evans v. Continental Cas. Co., 40 Wn.2d 614, 627, 245 P.2d 470, 478 (1952).
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ligation and no judgment has been entered, but the amount will be
certain. And yet the contractual obligation and the breach thereof
can be resolved in the garnishment proceeding, but not the breach of
an obligation imposed by law.
There seems to be a belief that the judgment creditor is better off
by virtue of the insurance company's failure to settle in that the creditor has recovered a judgment in an amount larger than he would have
received had his offer for settlement been accepted."8 However, two
observations are relevant with respect to this point.
First, the creditor is merely attempting to stand in the shoes of the
judgment debtor. Had the judgment debtor recovered a judgment
against his insurance company for negligent or bad faith failure to
settle, the court would not deny the judgment creditor the right to
cause a writ of garnishment to issue against the debtor's insurance
company on the basis of the debtor's judgment. Yet the existence of
the judgment against the insurance company makes the creditor's position no less anomolous, if his position is anomolous at all. The
creditor is still recovering due to the fact that the insurance company
failed to accept his offer of settlement.
Secondly, there is always the possibility that the judgment debtor
will refuse to bring an action against his insurance company. The
debtor might refrain from suing the insurance company because of
the fact that they in turn may refuse to renew his policy (this would
be the exception rather than the rule). Or, the insured knows that
he will probably get nothing as a result of suing his insurance company for his judgment creditor will realize on it through the garnishment proceedings. The debtor will see nothing except his attorney's
fee statement. If the debtor had little or no assets other than the
claim, then such a prerogative exclusively in the hands of the debtor
(which is the result of the Murray case) seems to permit fraud upon
creditors.
There has been recognition of the problems involved in precluding
the creditor from proceeding directly against the debtor's insurance
company in some state legislatures. For example, in Ohio a provision
was introduced in the legislature which would allow a judgment creditor to recover the amount of the judgment in excess of the policy limits
in cases where it could be established that the creditor had made a
settlement offer within the policy limits and the offer was rejected by
lS"It

would be therefore anomolous to permit claimant to recover directly against

company in his own right...

Keeton, supra note 4, at 1176.
K"
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the insurer without the consent or approval of the insured. 4 A similar
provision has been introduced in the New York legislature. 5
The purpose of this Note is not solely to criticize, but also to offer
a possible alternative solution to this problem. The subsequent discussion centers around the possibility of subjecting the judgment debtor's claim to levy of execution. Although the judgment creditor will
not be able to take advantage of this claim directly against the insurance company, it appears that he will be able to do so indirectly.
First, the Washington court recognizes that claims for property
damage are assignable." The test of assignability is whether or not
the claim survived at common law to the personal representative of
the assignor." Since a claim for damage to property survived at common law to the personal representative, it is assignable.
It is clear that an insured's claim of damages for his insurer's bad
faith or negligent failure to settle is based upon property damage as
opposed to damage to personal reputation or to the person. As a result of the insurance company's negligence or bad faith, the insured
is subject to being separated from his property in order to satisfy the
judgment in excess of the policy limits. If in fact this threat was
brought about by the insurer's misconduct, the debtor should have a
present right to have the threat removed.' At least one other jurisdiction has recognized that a claim for bad faith or negligent failure
to settle is assignable,' 9 thus recognizing the "property" nature of the
claim. A problematical question arises as to how the judgment debtor
has suffered property damage if he has not paid the judgment. One
rationale for finding present damage is that when the judgment is entered, the amount of the judgment debtor's debts is increased and
represents a presently increased threat to the debtor of loss of property. For example, in Washington, entry of a judgment in a superior
14 Thornbury, Liability of Insurance Companies for Payment of Judgments in Ohio,
18 INS. COUNSEL J. 442, 444 (1951). However, this is not presently the law in Ohio.
This provision
'5 Dempsey, "Excess Liability," 19 INs. COUNSEL J. 44, 57 (1952).
did not get out of committee.
16 Cooper v. Runnels, 48 Wn.2d 108, 291 P.2d 657 (1955) ; Polk v. Spokane Interstate Fair, 73 Wash. 610, 132 Pac. 401 (1913) ; Jordan v. Welch, 61 Wash. 569, 112
Pac. 656 (1911).
17 Cooper v. Runnels, supra note 16, at 110, 291 P.2d at 658. By virtue of Wash.
Sess. Laws, 1961, c. 137, all claims survive, with exceptions not applicable here.
Is Other rationales are discussed in Note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 568, 572 (1959).
19 Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957). The Communale case seems to be based upon a breach of a contractual promise, while the Brown
case seems to sound in tort. The court in the Brown case drew the similarity between
the insured's cause of action against his insurance company and one involving deceit.
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court automatically commences a lien upon real estate located in the
county in which the judgment is entered."
Another problem to be considered is that of ascertaining when the
debtor's claim against his insurance company arises. The Washington
position indicates that the claim arises upon entry of the judgment
against the insured, regardless of whether the insured has paid that
portion over and above the policy limits. 2' This seems to foreclose
any consideration of whether the policy is an "indemnity" policy or a
"liability" policy. Prior cases had incidated that if the policy was an
"indemnity" policy, the judgment debtor must first pay the judgment
before proceeding on the policy. If the policy was a "liability"
policy, then the insurer was liable on the policy as soon as the insured's
liability was established. When the insured's claim is based upon the
insurer's bad faith in failing to settle, such a claim sounds in tort, and
no defense on the contract can be maintained; 2 ' the insured is not
thereby attempting to recover on the insurance contract.
However, this position is not universal. A number of other jurisdictions require payment by the insured of the amount in excess of the
policy limits before the insured's claim arises for that excess. 5
Since this claim for negligent or bad faith failure to settle is one for
property damage and arises in this jurisdiction upon entry of the
judgment against the insured, it is submitted that at that time the claim
is also subject to levy of execution. "Stated otherwise, all kinds of
personal property of the debtor which he can make the subject of
voluntary transfer of title can by execution be made the subject of
involuntary transfer."2 The Washington statute governing execution
provides that "all property, real and personal, of the judgment debtor,
not exempted by law, shall be liable to execution."2 The court has
20 RCW 4.56.190-200.
21 Murray v. Mossman, 156 Wash. Dec. 924, 926, 355 P2d 985, 987 (1960). Other
cases taking this position include Wessing v. American Indem. Co., 127 F. Supp. 775
(W.D. Mo. 1955); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P2d 404
(1957) ; Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) ;
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957) ; Southern Fire
& as. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952) ; Schwartz v. Norwich Union Indem. Co., 212 Wis. 593, 250 N.W. 446 (1933).
22 Ford v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 70 Wash. 29, 126 Pac. 69 (1912).
23 Landaker v. Anderson, 145 Wash. 660, 261 Pac. 388 (1927).
24
Evans v. Continental as. Co., 40 Wn.2d 614, 245 P2d 470 (1952).
25 State Auto Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1939) ; Lee v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 634 (D. Md. 1960) ; Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
92 N.H. 140, 26 A.2d 361 (1942) ; Boling v. New Amsterdam as. Co., 173 Okla. 160,
46 P.2d 916 (1935) ; Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 126 Tex. 282, 86 S.W.2d
727 (1935).
20 33 C.J.S. Executions § 19, at 153 (1942).
27 RCW 6.04.060.
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interpreted "property" to include claims based upon contractual indebtedness,28 and has stated:
It is said, however, that some property is not subject to execution because the executing officer cannot, by reason of its nature, take it into
his manual possession, and that such is the character of this property
[a claim for indebtedness]. The statutes contemplate that, when it is
possible to do so, the levying officer must take actual possession of the
property levied upon, but it does not follow that a levy is insufficient
or cannot be made because of the inability of the executing officer to
actually take possession of the thing levied on. All that is necessary
under such circumstances is that he take it under his dominion-into
the owner of the
his constructive possession-by giving notice 2 to
9
property that it is levied upon and will be sold.
Although a later decision by the court indicates that it has not decided

whether such procedure as outlined above applies to claims sounding
in tort,"0 there is some language in the opinion to indicate that had the
proper procedure been followed, the court would have recognized the
validity of such action.3" One other jurisdiction, which has interpreted

the Washington execution statute to be identical with its own, 2 allows
levy of execution with respect to claims sounding in tort."
While it is true that the cases in which levy on claims has been
allowed were those in which the judgment debtor had already commenced court proceedings, this should not be a prerequisite to levy of
execution. The cited cases which hold that claims for property damage
are assignable were not cases in which the assignor had started court
proceedings.3 4 If the commencement of legal proceedings is not a
necessary prerequisite for the voluntary transfer of claims, then it
should not be a prerequisite for involuntary transfer. One possible
explanation for the fact that legal proceedings were commenced in
each case involving levy of execution is that the creditor probably
wanted to make sure that the claim was worth something before proJohnson v. Dahlquist, 130 Wash. 29, 225 Pac. 817 (1924).
29 Id. at 31-32, 225 Pac. 818 (1924).
30 Swanson v. Olympic Peninsula Motor Coach Co., 190 Wash. 35, 66 P2d 842
28

(1937).

31 In the Swanson case, the creditor attempted to levy upon the debtor's claim by
serving notice of the levy with a copy of the writ upon the clerk of the court in which
the claim was pending. The court held that this was an invalid levy. The debtor, not
the clerk, was in possession of his claim even when it was pending in court. The sheriff
could levy upon it and reduce it to possession only after notice to the debtor. This appears to the writer as a tacit recognition of the availability of the execution process as
to claims sounding in tort.
32 Meserve v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 2d 468, 38 P.2d 453, 456 (1934).
ss Everts v. Wills S. Fawcett Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 213, 74 P.2d 815 (1937).
34 See cases cited note 16 sitpra.
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ceeding against it. The fact that legal action had been commenced by
the debtor is some indication that the claim could result in a favorable
judgment for the debtor, and thus is some indicia of its value. Further,
the judgment creditors might not have known of the existence of the
respective claims until the commencement of legal proceedings. Whatever the reason, it does not appear to be due to any requirement of law.
One possible explanation for the court's position in the Murray case
might be applicable with reference to the procedure just outlined.
Some thought may have been given by the court to the impact upon
settlement negotiations if the creditor had been permitted to proceed
directly against the debtor's insurance company. There may have
been concern over the propriety of placing such a weapon in the hands
of a plaintiff who would be negotiating with the defendant's insurance
company. Perhaps the court felt that a truly undeserving plaintiff
might force the defendant's insurance company to settle rather than
risk a suit for allegedly demonstrating bad faith or negligence in failing
to settle within the policy limits. If the court was concerned over such
a possibility arising had Murray gone the other way, such concern
should also arise by permitting levy of execution upon the insured's
claim against his insurance company.
However, if such a policy consideration did enter into the Murray
decision, it is submitted that the concern was misplaced, at least as to
its application with reference to levy of execution upon a defendant's
claim. First, the judgment creditor would have to buy such a claim
at the execution sale. He is not likely to do so or even threaten to do
so unless there is a reasonable belief, supportable by admissable evidence, that in fact the insurance company was demonstrating bad
faith in refusing to settle. An undeserving plaintiff would be hard
pressed to find any such evidence. If the insurer is demonstrating bad
faith, there is no reason not to allow pressure in the form of a threat
of a later levy of execution upon the insured's cause of action.
Although the Washington position seems to be solidified against a
judgment creditor's direct action against his debtor's tortfeasor in light
of Murray v. Mossman 5 the path seems to be clear for the creditor to
accomplish the same result by levying upon the claim in the hands of
the debtor.
PAUL
I' 156 Wash. Dec. 924, 355 P2d 985 (1960).
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